A common approach to protect user's privacy in data collection is to perform random perturbations on user's sensitive data before collection in a way that aggregated statistics can still be inferred without endangering individual secrets. In this paper, we take a closer look at the validity of Differential Privacy guarantees, when sensitive attributes are subject to social contagion. We first show that in the absence of any knowledge about the contagion network, an adversary that tries to predict the real values from perturbed ones, cannot train a classifier that achieves an area under the ROC curve (AUC) above 1 − (1 − δ)/(1+e ε ), if the dataset is perturbed using an (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism. Then, we show that with the knowledge of the contagion network and model, one can do substantially better. We demonstrate that our method passes the performance limit imposed by differential privacy. Our experiments also reveal that nodes with high influence on others are at more risk of revealing their secrets than others. Our method's superior performance is demonstrated through extensive experiments on synthetic and real-world networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The last decade has witnessed the exponential growth in data collection practices. While access to large-scale data has fueled an unprecedented power to solve problems previously thought impossible, it also imposes a great risk on the privacy of individuals in this new environment. It is widely recognized that social interactions shape the landscape of individual attributes -infectious diseases spread through social interactions and contacts; behavior changes such as obesity [1] , exercising [2] , or decision making processes such as voting [3] or charity donation [4] are contagious.
Due to the ubiquity of online social platforms, information about social ties and social interaction has become available. Such data can be available to the public with little effort (e.g.: professional affiliation on public web pages or friendship networks in public social networks such as Twitter). The question we ask is: how safe are people's sensitive attributes in a socially connected world?
To answer this, we need to take a closer look at policies proposed to protect users' privacy. A common policy is to consider individual data items sensitive, while knowledge of aggregated statistics on a population not. One of the most widely used privacy frameworks based on this approach is Differential Privacy (DP) [5] . Suppose that the individuals participate in a survey in which they are asked about the sensitive attribute X with value 0 or 1. The goal of the survey is to learn the aggregated percentage of population who report "1". Worried about their privacy, participants may use a randomized perturbation mechanism M to answer the survey. A simple scheme for M is to flip a coin. If head, report 1 or 0 at random, otherwise report the true value. Although we cannot reveal individual values with certainty, we can approximate aggregate statistics by removing biases introduced by M.
Our major contributions are as follows:
• We show that for any perturbation mechanism M that guarantees (ε, δ)-differential privacy, i.e., ∀z, x = x ,
the best classifier from an attacker, without information of the social ties and the contagion models, has the Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) at most 1−(1−δ)/(e ε +1). • Next, we propose a method to infer the original sensitive values {x i }, using the contagion model, the network structure, the perturbation mechanism M and the noisy reported values {z i }. This requires understanding how the real values correlate by accurately modeling the way they are produced by a contagion process. • In prior work, to avoid too much complexity, contagion dynamics are ignored in calculating correlations between individual values. This results in models that can be too simplistic to reflect real-world phenomena. Our model incorporates the network structure and contagion model directly into our calculations. • Through rigorous experiments on both synthetic and realworld networks, we show that our method can achieve an AUC value higher than the limit imposed by DP, which indicates that the privacy guarantee is weakened by the addition of new data. Note that this new information can be publicly available and on itself harmless, but can indeed be exploited to infer sensitive knowledge. We also observe that nodes with high influence over others are more vulnerable to such attacks. In what follows, after reviewing related work, we show the tight upper bound on the performance of a binary classification with DP protection, with no access to the contagion network, followed by our attack leveraging social network structure and contagion model. We report the results of our experiments at the end. Due to limited space, we were unable to present everything. To see the omitted material check out the extended version of this paper 1 .
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Contagion Models: Few models have received great attention in the literature. Among popular models are Linear Threshold or Independent Cascade models where a set of activated nodes keep growing via particular rules until the growth stops, and time-continuous models where activated nodes can indefinitely try to activate their neighbors, such as the Susceptible-Infected model. More sophisticated models are also proposed, such as General Threshold model [6] , [7] or Complex Contagions [8] , [9] , but due to their complexity, they are not yet widely used. In this work we employ the Linear Threshold model.
Data Privacy:
The most widely adopted privacy model is the model of differential privacy (DP) [5] , which imposes constraints on publishing aggregate information about a database such that the privacy impact on individual entries is limited. Specifically, a randomized algorithm A that takes a dataset as input is said to have (ε, δ)-differential privacy, if for all datasets D 1 and D 2 that differ on a single entry, and all subsets S of the image of A:
The probability is taken over the randomness of the algorithm.
The original DP model does not explicitly specify the ramifications of the presence of correlation between data points, which could be accessible from outside. In fact, it is proved that when the data is assumed to be correlated, the privacy guarantees provided by DP becomes weaker [10] . Inspired by this shortcoming, many have proposed improvements over DP in an attempt to come up with definitions that can provide privacy guarantees while modeling more complex relations between data items [10] - [12] . However, due to their complexity, we have yet to see any of them become as widely adopted as DP.
Finding Effectors: Given the final activation state of a contagion in a social network, the k-effector problem is the problem of finding the most likely k nodes that have initiated the contagion (called effectors). This problem is NP-hard for general graphs and even DAGs, but is solvable in polynomial time by dynamic programming on trees [13] . For general graphs, a heuristic algorithm is to extract the most probable tree (which is NP-hard) and run the optimal algorithm on that tree [13] .
Privacy of Social Networks and Attributes: Our work is different from previous work on protecting social network privacy, which assumes that the social network graph itself is private data and network-wide statistics (e.g., degree distribution) is released [14] . We assume that the social network structure is publicly available and only the socially contagious attributes are sensitive.
Somewhat similar to our work, Song et al. [15] considered flu infection -estimating how many people get flu while preventing the status of any particular individual being revealed. To avoid the intricate details of social contagion, they assume an overly simplified model where values for all nodes in the same connected component are equally correlated. In our work, we assume a contagion model that is aligned with established literature on contagion and social influence.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
For a population of n individuals, let x i be a sensitive binary attribute for individual i, x i ∈ {0, 1}, and denote by X the set of all values x 1 , · · · , x n . We assume that this attribute is contagious and propagates over a directed network G(V, E) following the Linear Threshold cascade model. In this model, each edge has a weight w(u, v) ∈ (0, 1] which represents the influence that node u exerts on node v. Each node also has a threshold λ v which is selected uniformly at random from (0, 1]. If the sum of influence from infected ingoing neighbors goes beyond λ v , v becomes activated in the next round. Assuming that the set of activated nodes, A, is not empty at time 0, we can build it iteratively at every step via the following rule:
Here N in (v) is the set of neighbors with edges pointing to v (i.e., imposing influence on v). The process proceeds until A stops growing. Imagine that these individuals participate in a survey in which they are each asked about their sensitive attribute x i . The goal of this survey is to calculate some aggregate statistic, e.g., the percentage of individuals having attribute 1.
To avoid revealing their secrets, they could use a randomized perturbation mechanism, M : {0, 1} → {0, 1}, and use the resulting values to answer the survey. The observed answer of participants is the sequence z 1 , · · · , z n , denoted by Z, where
In this paper we want to examine two problems:
• What is the performance of the best classifier, using only information in Z and M, to infer the true values X? • If one also knows the contagion network G and the contagion model, can one perform better? The difference from the answer to the earlier question is the loss of privacy.
IV. LIMITATIONS OF BINARY CLASSIFICATION WITH DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
To show that the underlying contagion network provides essential information that can pose a real threat to privacy, we study the limits of binary classification given only the reported values (Z) and the randomization parameters of M. This is a fair assumption since the real values, X, are never disclosed but Z is, and M is known to all participants.
A classifier scores and subsequently ranks the participants based on their likelihood of having x = 1. We measure the success of such ranking by the probability that a randomly selected sample with x = 1 (a positive sample) is ranked higher than a randomly selected sample with x = 0 (a negative sample). This is known to be the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC curve) in an unsupervised classification problem, namely the AUC value [16] .
Theorem 1. Any classification attempt by an adversary, having access to only Z and M, will have an Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) at most 1 − (1 − δ)/(e ε + 1).
Recall that the ROC curve of a classifier is plotting the true positive rate (TPR) against the false positive rate (FPR) at various threshold settings. AUC can be understood as the probability that the classifier ranks R 1 higher than R 0 , denoted by P (R 1 > R 0 ), where R 1 (R 0 ) is a randomly chosen positive (negative) sample, with x = 1 (x = 0).
Suppose we take a positive (negative) sample x (x ) and the perturbation mechanism M produces a perturbed value z (z ). Let's denote Pr(M(x) = z) by P (x )z) for brevity. Let S 1 and S 0 be two distributions over (−∞, +∞) from which a score is drawn, if z = 1 or z = 0 respectively. For the perturbed value z, z , the classifier chooses a score s, s from S z , S z respectively and the ranking is produced based on the scores. Denote by γ(z, z ) the probability that s is higher than s , i.e., Pr[s > s |s ∼ S z , s ∼ S z ]. Obviously,
Then we can write P (R 1 > R 0 ) as (Section 2 of [17] ):
Continuing the above, we have:
Observation 1. Let γ * be the one maximizing AUC, i.e., arg max γ P (R 1 > R 0 ). Then, γ * (1, 0) = 1, if
and 0 otherwise.
The above is clear from the right hand side of (4). This shows that an optimal AUC is achieved by a deterministic classification rule based solely on the condition in Observation 1.
Corollary 1. Bayesian inference achieves optimal AUC.
The above is proved in the extended version. We can now prove Theorem 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that the condition in Observation 1 holds, then (4) can be further simplified as:
On the other hand, by DP guarantees we have:
As a result, we can write:
Thus, Theorem 1 is proved. Note that the bound is realized if the inequalities in Equation (3) become equality. This theorem shows that if this bound is significantly surpassed, the guarantees provided by ε-DP no longer hold.
V. ALGORITHM
A. Objective Function
Our goal is to infer P (x v = 1) for all v. We denote this probability by x v throughout this paper (note the difference between x and x). To do this, we first find the initial seeds of contagion, then calculate the corresponding x v . Our solution is hence an arrangement of probabilities of each node v being initially active, denoted by α v . Rather than a fixed number of most likely seeds, we seek to find a distribution of initial seeds that are likely to produce the observed Z.
We try to minimize the expected Symmetric Difference, D, between observed reports, Z and a random report,Z, drawn from the distribution of all possible reports, R. We have:
Let α be an assignment of the initial activation probabilities and Then, we have:
In the above ∼z v = 1 − z v , and the last line is due to
We define our objective function as f = E D(Ẑ, Z) and find an α that minimizes f .
Theorem 2.
Suppose that X * = (x * 1 , · · · , x * n ) are the real attribute values. LetP (z) be the fraction of vertices reporting 1 and c = P (1 )1) − P (0 )1),
Then, with high probability 2 :
The above is proved in the extended version. The value of P (z) can be estimated from data by |{v ∈ V : z v = 1}| /n. By further simplifying (10) and employing Theorem 2, we can now write our full objective function:
Although our solution finds soft probabilities (x v ∈ [0, 1]) instead of discrete values (x v ∈ {0, 1}), our experiments show that having this constraint generally increases the accuracy of inferred values.
B. Modelling Contagion
With α, we want to derive a formula for x v , the probability that node v is active in the end. Computing the influence of contagion given a fixed α can be done in linear time for a DAG, using the following formula: (Lemma 3 [18] ).
x
Since the original graph G is not necessarily a DAG, we find local DAGs containing nodes who impose high influence. In this way, we try to benefit from the structural simplicity of DAGs, while losing minimal information. The approach of using local structures to approximate the influence in a general graph has been widely used in prior works in the context of influence maximization [18] - [20] . Each DAG D t starts with only t. We then calculate an influence (denoted by Inf(v, t)) value for each node v, which is the probability that t is activated if only v was initially active and influence spread through the current state of D t . At each step, a node outside with the highest Inf(.) is added to D t with all its outgoing edges that connect to nodes currently in D t . This ensures that D t remains a DAG. We then update Inf for neighbors of v outisde of D t . This can stop in two ways: (1) When Inf for the most influential node falls below a threshold, η, or (2) the DAG grows bigger than a certain size, N max . If implemented using an efficient priority queue for Inf(v, t) values, this runs in O(|E t | log |E t |) time. The activation probability of t, using only edges in D t , denoted by x t (v), is the most accurate approximation of t's real activation probability and will be used instead of x t in (13) .
To solve the constrained optimization of (12), we need to calculate gradients of f with respect to α v 's. This can be done efficiently via Dynamic Programming by traversing nodes in each DAG once in reverse topological order to compute ∂xt(t) ∂xt(v) , and then traversing them in topological order to compute ∂f ∂αv . Overall, this takes O( t |E t |) time.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
Here we show that our attack is successful at going beyond the bound in Theorem 1. We show that each part of our method is essential to its success and investigate attributes that can identify nodes vulnerable against our attack.
A. Experiment Setting
We tested the following methods in our experiments: 1) CO-DAG: Our main method, which optimizes (12) . 2) O-DAG: Similar to CO-DAG, but without enforcing the constraint on
x v /n.
3) CO-RND:
To test the effectiveness of greedy DAGs, we extract random DAGs from the same networks by adding random neighbors of nodes in the DAG until it reaches a certain size, N max . The rest is similar to CO-DAG. 4) Lappas+ [13] : k-effectors algorithm. Note this method knows k beforehand and has access to more information. For datasets, we use 4 types of synthetic networks: 1) Core-Periphery [21] : A random network with a sparse periphery and a dense center, generated as Kronecker graphs [22] with M = [0.9, 0.5; 0.5, 0.3]. 2) Erdos-Renyi: A random network in which all possible edges have equal probability p to appear. We set p such that the expected out-degree of every node will be 5.
3) Power-law:
A network with a power-law degree distribution where f (x) ∝ x −γ . We set γ = 1 to produce a degree sequence and ran configuration model [23] to obtain a network. 4) Hierarchical [24] : Random hierarchies generated as Kronecker graphs with M = [0.9, 0.1; 0.1, 0.9]. We generate networks with 500 nodes, remove self-loops and nodes having both in and out-degrees less than 3 (except for Hierarchical networks). We assign random influence weights between (0, 1] to edges, then normalize incoming links to each node such that they sum to 1.
We also experiment on 4 real-world networks that are extensively studied in the context of social contagion: two coauthorship networks GrQc (|V |: 2422, |E|: 21842) and HepTh (|V |: 4909, |E|: 38704) [25] and two co-purchase networks in Amazon, one containing videos (|V |: 1598, |E|: 8402) and the other DVDs (|V |: 9488, |E|: 55146) [26] , [27] .
We simulate 10 cascades for each generated network. We first select an initial seed set, and then simulate the contagion and only keep the resulting cascade if it contains at last 1/4 and at most 3/4 of all nodes. Cascades are simulated using the triggering set approach [28] : Each edge (u, v) is kept with probability w(u, v) and tossed otherwise. Any node still reachable from any of the seed nodes is deemed active.
To produce differentially private z v values, we choose the Randomized Response (RR) mechanism [29] in which participants tell the truth with probability β, and respond with 0 or 1 with equal probability otherwise. An RR mechanism with parameter β is a DP mechanism with ε = log ((1 + β)/(1 − β)). To do the inference, we need to extract DAGs for each node. For random DAGs (used in CO-RND), we set N max as the average number of nodes in their corresponding greedy DAGs as node capacity. To optimize (12), we use ALGLIB 3 library. Going Above the Bound: We proved that, without extra information about the contagion, it is impossible to achieve an AUC above 1 − (1 − δ)/(1 + e ε ) on binary attributes perturbed by a (ε, δ)-DP mechanism. Here, we test this guarantee after the contagion graph is known to an adversary. For 5 values of RR's β we perform inference using methods described in Section VI-A and report the resulting AUC scores, the corresponding ε and theoretical upper bounds in Table I . As expected, we observe that the AUC scores for Bayesianis close to the theoretical upper bound. Furthermore, note that in almost all cases CO-DAG achieves the highest AUC score and in all cases the value is beyond the AUC upper bound with DP guarantees, with the difference peaking at medium range of β. We also observe that in cases where β is extremely low and the perturbed data is extremely noisy, O-DAG tends to outperform CO-DAG. We believe that this is due to the low quality of the bound on
x v /n when the added noise gets too big. Our method's capability to go beyond the bound is not trivial, since Lappas+ fails to do so in all but one cases, even as it receives more information as input (number of seeds, k). Finally, notice that in virtually all cases, dropping the greedy DAGs or the constraint on x v /n hurts performance. Impacts of DAG's Size on Inference: We now test the impact of changing η (the Inf threshold in DAG selection) or N max (maximum nodes allowed in a DAG) on performance.
With a fixed RR's β, we vary η and N max across 4 synthetic networks. Since we are interested in changes in the AUC scores and not absolute values, we move each resulting curve so the starting point of plots for N max and the ending point of plots for η land on 0.
The results for η and N max are depicted in Figure 1 , top and bottom respectively. Generally, more inclusive DAGs result in more accurate results. But surprisingly, when perturbation is minimal (β = 0.9), larger DAGs can actually decrease quality. Who is More Vulnerable?: To identify traits that can indicate vulnerability against our attack, we use the expected accuracy of a node's inferred value if a threshold θ was randomly selected from [0, 1]:
where I(·) is an indicator function. Note that we are not interested in the absolute accuracy values (which needs ground truth values), but the relative difference between two nodes, which E[Acc] is capable of measuring.
After testing out-degree, in-degree, and PageRank in Core-Periphery networks, we observed that only Out-degree shows a strong correlation with E[Acc]. We then test if this correlation exists across all 4 synthetic networks and how it changes with varying β. Our experiments show that in networks with uneven out-degree distribution (Core-Periphery, Power-law, and Hierarchical), the correlation is much stronger, and gets stronger as β grows. But in Erdos-Renyi graphs, where degree is more evenly distributed, the correlation is weak and does not change much with β. More comprehensive discussions and visualizations is available in the extended version of this paper.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We provided further evidence that a privacy-protecting measure ignorant of socially contagious properties of attributes is unlikely to provide practical guarantees. There are two obvious directions for future work: 1) design a privacy protection mechanism that is contagion-aware; Our method can be used to test if that method succeeds. 2) extend our results to other contagion models. Notice that the extension to any progressive contagion model (where active nodes stay active) with a differentiable formula (e.g, Independent Cascade model) is easily possible. Efficient implementation, however, is a challenge.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Aria Rezaei and Jie Gao acknowledge support through NSF DMS-1737812, NSF CNS-1618391 and NSF CCF-1535900. 
